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Bilateralism Under The World Trade
Organization

Y.S.Lee, Ph.D. *
I. INTRODUCTION
The establishment of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), which
replaced the five decades of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") regime,' has significantly reinforced multilateral control over
international trade on a global scale. As of October 2005, membership in
the WTO has reached 148 nations, including the majority of former Soviet
bloc and other communist countries, 2 making the WTO the "United Nations
of International Trade.",3 WTO disciplines have significant impact on world
trade today; they have been enforced by the monitoring activities of various
WTO bodies and by strengthened dispute resolution mechanisms. In
addition, a significant number of bilateral/regional trade agreements coexist alongside the WTO. There are over 130 of these agreements in force.
Around 90% of WTO members have signed at least one or more regional
trade agreements ("RTAs"). Thus, the bilateralism represented by these
RTAs is as much a factor as the multilateralism of the WTO in shaping
international trade relations today.4
RTAs provide exclusive preferential treatment to trade with member

* Dr. Y.S. Lee graduated from the University of California at Berkeley (A.B., economics)
and the University of Cambridge (B.A., Ph.D., law). This paper is a revised version of the
presentation made by the author at the City University of Hong Kong Conference on WTO
& Greater China, Hong Kong, March 10-11, 2005.
1The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was implemented in 1947 as a
post war discipline of international trade. For the history of the GATT, see JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 31-43 (1997).
2 China obtained WTO membership in 2001; Russia is currently going through
negotiations for its accession to the WTO.
3 Currently WTO membership includes all major economies and trading nations, except
perhaps Russia.
4 The bilateralism discussed in this paper encompasses the concept of regionalism, as
opposed to multilateralism, under the WTO system.
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states. These exclusionary preferences by RTAs create a discriminatory
environment in international trade. This is not consistent with the core
objective of the multilateral trading system, namely the Most-Favored
Nation ("MFN") principle.5 Current GATT/WTO provisions allow for the
establishment of a customs union or free trade area as an exception to the
MFN requirement. The rationale for this exception is that the preferential
trade arrangement of a customs union or free trade area could eventually
develop into a multinational framework, thereby giving the benefit of lower
trade barriers to more countries as the number of participating countries
increases.
The growth of membership has also been seen in many customs or free
trade areas. For example, the European Community has grown well beyond
its original membership, which was comprised a limited number of Western
European countries, to include most of Europe today. The proliferation of
these trade "clubs," which provide trade preferences limited to their
members, may undermine the WTO's objective of promoting nondiscriminatory trade for all nations. 8 Problems are compounded because
some of the recent bilateral trade agreements purport to impose regulatory
elements beyond the reduction of trade barriers, such as enforcement of
intellectual property rights, the requirement of environmental and labor
standards, and the authorization of uninhibited capital transfers. The
inclusion and promotion of these regulatory elements in free trade
agreements ("FTAs") has significant implications on the current
multilateral trading system.
Section Ilof this article discusses the
proliferation of RTAs, most of which are FTAs, as well as their impact on
and consistency with the multilateral trading system. The Mainland China
and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement is introduced as
an example of a recent bilateral trade treaty between developed and
developing economies; its consistency with relevant WTO requirements is
examined.
This article also provides a discussion of bilateralism in the regulation
of investment measures, as represented by numerous bilateral investment
treaties ("BITs"), and examines its consistency with relevant provisions of
the WTO. Unlike trade, there is no comprehensive multilateral framework
5Article I of GATT stipulates the MFN principle, which prohibits discriminatory
treatment with respect to importation from WTO Members. See GATT Secretariat, The
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Text 486-87
(June 1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round].
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, Art. XXIV [hereinafter GATT]. Id. at 522-25.
7 The membership grew from the six original members of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) in the 1950s to twenty-five nations in 2004. The History of the
European Union, http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index-en.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
8 Uruguay Round, supra note 5, at 486-87.
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for investment on a global scale. A previous attempt by the Organization
for Economic Co-Operation and Development to create one failed, 9 while
over 1,100 BITs around the world provide some regulatory governance in
this area at the bilateral level. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures provides a few provisions that prohibit some traderelated investment measures. The General Agreement on Trade in Services
also has provisions that have relevance to the regulation of investment
measures. Section III of this paper questions the regulatory consistency of
BITs with relevant WTO provisions.
II. REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO 10
A. Proliferation of RTAs
Most RTAs create free trade areas among signatory countries by
eliminating both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. These FTAs can be
bilateral agreements, as in the Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, or they
can be multilateral agreements, such as the European Union ("EU")
agreement. In addition to creating free trade, multilateral FTAs can create
powerful economic entities, as is the case with the EU, the North America
Free Trade Area ("NAFTA"), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Free Trade Area ("ASEAN"), and the Mercado Comum der Sur: The
Southern Common Market in Latin America ("MERCOSUR").
"The WTO approves the formation of an RTA where it eliminates
trade barriers with respect to substantially all the trade among its members
and where it does not raise trade barriers to non-members after its
formation."'" The latter requirement is meant to ensure that RTAs do not
develop into exclusive trade blocs, such as those that proliferated in the
1930s' and contributed to deepening the worldwide depression and

9 The OECD launched negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)

in 1995 as a "free standing international treaty, open to all OECD Members and the
European Communities, and to accession by non-OECD Member Countries." Its proposed
objective was to "provide a broad multilateral framework for international investment with
high standards for the liberalization of investment regimes and investment protection and
with effective dispute settlement procedures." A series of intense negotiations ceased in
1998 without reaching an agreement on the final version.
10 The background information of sections II.A & B of this paper are drawn from the
author's forthcoming article, Y.S. Lee, Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade
Liberalization:A Viable Answer for Economic Development?, 29 J.OF WORLD TRADE 701,
701-17 (2005).
11 Uruguay Round, supra note 5, at 457-60 (emphasis added).
12 Major economic powers, such as Britain, France, and the United States erected trade
barriers in their home and colonial markets. As a result, exporters from countries without
vast domestic or colonial markets, such as Germany and Italy, were put at a substantial
disadvantage.
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provided a cause for the Second World War.' 3 As mentioned above, the
rationale for the authorization of an RTA is that its membership
eventually
14
increase to include more countries to benefit from free trade.
It has also been observed that RTAs have proliferated because
multilateral negotiations on a global scale have become more difficult in
certain areas, as the subjects of multilateral negotiations in the WTO
framework have been expanded into politically sensitive areas such as trade
and investment, trade and competition policy, intellectual property rights,
and epidemics. 5 As an alternative to multilateral negotiations on a global
scale that could take years to come to any consensus, nations have begun to
resort to trade negotiations among a more limited number of countries
sharing common interests in trade and investment, closer economic and
cultural ties, and geographic proximity. This trend has led to the formation
of a number of RTAs around the world, as previously noted. In 2002, the
four largest free trade areas (the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN)
16
accounted for 64.5% of world exports and 69.5% of world imports.
Concerns have been expressed against this proliferation of RTAs, since they
may erode WTO disciplines and distract members from important
multilateral negotiations.
B. Undermining the Objectives of the WTO?
The fundamental problem with RTAs is that the exclusive nature of
their trade preference is not consistent with the MFN principle of the
GATT/WTO disciplines. At its inception GATT may have been a political
requirement to accommodate the remaining colonial trade preferences of
the world powers 17 and to support the reconciliation efforts of the war-torn
European countries by permitting exclusive trade preferences among
8
themselves.1
Even
though trade
non-member
do still
not
increase after the
formation
of anbarriers
RTA,19 toexclusive
trade countries
preferences

13 For

the economic causes of the Second World War, see

ANDREW

J. CROZIER,

THE

CAUSES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1997).

The expansion of the European Community is an example. See supra note 7.
15Mitsuo Matsushita, Legal Aspects of Free Trade Agreements In the Context of Article
XXIV of the GATT 1994, paper presented at the seminar, The Way Forwardto Successful
Doha Development Agenda Negotiation, United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan (May 2425, 2004). The failure of the WTO ministerial conference in Cancun has shown this
difficulty. See Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
14

Conference in Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 219-44
(2004).
16Matsushita, supra note 15.
17GATT Art. I,
2-3; UruguayRound, supranote 5, at 486-87.
18Reconciliation was an important motivation behind the establishment of the

European
Communities, whose membership has increased substantially over the years. Supra note 7.
" GATT Art. XXIV. Uruguay Round, supra note 5, at 522-25.
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put competing non-member countries at a relative disadvantage with
respect to their trade. It is particularly true with developing countries
whose export industries are not as competitive as those of their developed
counterparts. 20 The late Professor Robert Hudec, an eminent trade scholar,
was critical of trade preference regimes for this reason and believed that an
MFN-based regime is the only genuine protection available to developing
countries as "a legal substitute for economic power on behalf of smaller
countries. ,,21
The proliferation of RTAs creates a risk of fragmenting the world
trading system, which may ultimately threaten the integrity of the
multilateral trading regime. This occurs despite the perceived benefit
within these trade clubs and the possibility of their expansion to confer the
benefit of free trade on more nations. How can the dilemma be resolved?
Because the source of the problem is the gap in trade concessions made
multilaterally and those made regionally, one possibility is to narrow this
gap by eliminating trade barriers within regional trade areas gradually at
more or less the same rate and on the same timetable as the lowering of
barriers towards non-members. Renato Ruggiero, former General Director
of the WTO, has observed this possibility in certain regional trade areas,
such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC").22 In this
scenario, the danger of fragmenting the world trading system and the threat
to the trade of non-member developing countries will be minimized.
Nonetheless, this approach may defeat the very purpose of RTAs-that is,
to provide exclusive trade preferences to their members. Therefore, this
approach may not be followed by the countries that favor exclusive trade
preferences.
Yet another possibility has been suggested by Yale economist T.N.
Srinivasan, who stated in a 1999 WTO high-level symposium on Trade and
Development that a "sunset clause" should be introduced to regional
agreements whereby preferences available to the agreement's members are
extended to all WTO members in five years.23 This proposal allows
members of the existing RTAs to maintain exclusive trade preferences
temporarily, but these preferences will no longer be "exclusive" vis-A-vis
20 For instance, it is easily conceivable that China will have many more difficulties in
exporting their automobiles to France than Germany would have because of the trade
preference received by Germany under the EU regulations, as well as the difference in the
quality and efficiency of the automobile industries between the two countries.
21 ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 216-17
(1987).
22Press Release, WTO, WTO Director-General Cites Progress in Telecoms and Calls on
the Singapore Agenda to Address Problems of Least Developed Countries (April 26, 1996),
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres96_e/pr046_e.htm.
23Summary of WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and Development (1999),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devele/summhle.htm.
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other WTO members after the expiration of this fixed period. This proposal
is in some sense a reassertion of the MFN principle, which has been waived
24
for the formation of a customs union/free trade area under Article XXIV.
Both of the above proposals aim to eliminate exclusive trade preferences
enjoyed by the members of RTAs. Nevertheless, the question is whether
these members would be willing to give up exclusive trade preferences.
A new breed of RTAs (promoted by certain developed countries such
as the United States) complicates the issue since they not only seek to
eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers but also attempt to instill certain
regulatory elements in trade relations. These elements include enforcement
of intellectual property rights ("IPR"), the requirement of environmental
and labor standards, and authorization of uninhibited capital transfers.2 5
These new requirements go beyond the facilitation of international trade by
reducing trade barriers and pose new problems of another dimension-these
RTAs impose a new set of trade rules on their members which are not yet
agreed upon multilaterally at the WTO level. This will complicate and
cause inconsistencies in the discipline of world trade.
This new type of RTA has been negotiated by developed and
26
developing countries (e.g., the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement
and the United States-Central America Free Trade Agreement 27). There is
concern that the effects of the new regulatory requirements in these RTAs
are not limited to trade, but may cause adverse consequences for the
economic growth of developing countries. For instance, the stringent
requirement of IPR protection will diminish the availability of new
information and technology necessary for development and will make its
use costly. The establishment and enforcement of a legal system to protect
IPRs can also be costly 28 and may cause a substantial diversion of scarce
24 GATT Art. XXIV. Uruguay Round, supra note 5, at 522-25.
25 Alvin Hilaire & Yongzheng Yang, The United States and the New Regionalism/
Bilateralism,38 J. WORLD TRADE 603, 609 (2004).
26 Full Text of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilatera/Australia-FTA/Final-Text/asset-upl
oad -filel48_5168.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
27 Full Text of the Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade
Agreement (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/
CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
28 j. Michael Finger has pointed out that:
According to a study, implementing an IPR regime such as the one required by the WTO's
TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) obligations would cost each
of the least developed countries $150 million, representing a full year's development budget
of many of the least developed countries, to invest in buildings, equipment, training, and so
forth.

J. Michael Finger, The WTO's Special Burden on Less Developed Countries, 19 CATO J.
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human and capital resources that could be used more productively

elsewhere. Other requirements, such as labor and environmental 29standards,
could be equally costly and burdensome on developing countries.

C. The Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangement
A recent FTA between a developed and a developing economy

illustrates consistency between a bilateral trade arrangement and a
multilateral trading system. On June 29, 2003, the Government of Hong

Kong Special Administrative Region ("Hong Kong") and the Central
People's Government of China signed the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer
Economic Partnership Arrangement ("CEPA"), which went into effect on
January 1, 2004. This is the first major trade agreement between Mainland

China and Hong Kong since the latter joined China in the principle of "one
country, two systems. 30 As both Hong Kong and mainland China retain
separate memberships in the WTO, GATT Article XXIV regulates CEPA

and authorizes the establishment of a free trade area. 3'
CEPA requires the progressive elimination of both tariff and non-tariff
measures on trade between Mainland China and Hong Kong. These trade
425, 435 (2000).
29 RTAs

should not be used as a means to get around the terms of the multilateral trade agreement of
the WTO and impose various regulatory requirements on developing countries that are not
directly relevant to the facilitation of trade, such as IPR enforcement and labor and
environmental standards. Of course, a developing country is not required to join any [RTA]
but it may not afford to stay outside where strong initiatives for RTAs are made by powerful
economies bilaterally or regionally where the developing country has an essential economic
interest.
Lee, supra note 10, at 714.
In order to safeguard the interests of developing countries secured under the multilateral
system,
consideration should be given to specifying in the relevant WTO provisions that Members
are prohibited from engaging in any arrangement bilaterally or otherwise that would
undermine these rights of developing countries protected under the WTO provisions. The
current WTO provision stipulates a similar requirement where it prohibits Members from
entering into any arrangement that allows gray-area measures by which trading countries
agree to restrain trade for the benefit of the domestic producers of the importing country.
Id. at 714-15 (citing article 11.1 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, Uruguay Round,
supra note 5, at 321).
30Under this system, Hong Kong will preserve its political, economic and social
autonomy from 1997-2047.
31Uruguay Round, supra note 5, at 522-25.
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liberalization efforts are to be made for both trade in goods and trade in
services. The objectives of CEPA are laid out in Article 1:
To strengthen trade and investment cooperation between the Mainland
and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region... and promote
joint development of the two sides, through the implementation of the
following measures:
1.Progressively reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers on
substantially all the trade in goods between the two sides;
2. Progressively achieving liberalization of trade in services through
reduction or elimination of substantially all discriminatory
measures;
32
3. Promoting trade and investment facilitation.
Article 5 of CEPA further provides the timetable for "zero tariffs" on
goods traded between Mainland China and Hong Kong.33

Other articles

regulate the application of certain trade measures (Articles 6 through 9), the
rules of origin (Article 10), progressive liberalization of trade in services
(Articles 11 through 15), and trade and investment facilitation (Articles 16
and 17).

The first consideration is whether CEPA is consistent with the WTO
disciplines. To the extent that it governs trade in goods, CEPA conforms to
GATT Article XXIV requirements for the creation of a free trade area, i.e.,
CEPA purports to eliminate trade barriers with respect to substantially all of
the trade between Mainland China and Hong Kong.35 Higher barriers are
not set against the imports of other countries after the implementation of
CEPA. Such actions are consistent with Article XXIV requirements.
Nonetheless, by January 1, 2006, China will impose no tariff on imports
from Hong Kong. Thus, Hong Kong exporters will enjoy a competitive
advantage over other exporters to China (Hong Kong already imposes no
tariffs on Chinese imports).
As discussed above, exclusive trade
Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, P.R.C.-H.K., June
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/files/main-e.pdf [hereinafter CEPA].
33 Article 5 of CEPA provides:
32

I.
2.
3.

4.

Id. at arts. 6-17.
GATT Art. XXIV

35

2003,

Hong Kong will continue to apply zero tariff to all imported goods of Mainland origin.
From 1 January 2004, the Mainland will apply zero tariff to the import of those goods
of Hong Kong origin listed in Table 1 of Annex 1.
No later than 1 January 2006, the Mainland will apply zero tariff to the import of goods
of Hong Kong origin that are outside Table I of Annex 1. Detailed implementation
procedures are set out in Annex 1.
Any new goods that are subject to elimination of import tariffs in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this Article shall be added to Annex 1.

Id. at art. 5.
34

29,

8(b).
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preferences among a customs union or free trade area operate as an
exception to the MFN principle of the WTO. An exclusive preference will
justifiably exist between Hong Kong and mainland China by way of trade
concessions to an extent that is not available to other WTO members.
Second, CEPA is not classified as a new breed of RTA. This is
because CEPA does not impose new regulatory schemes, such as IPR
protection and enforcement, labor and environmental standards, or the
authorization of uninhibited capital transfers. CEPA focuses on the
traditional function of a free trade agreement, which is the liberalization of
trade. In line with the facilitation of trade liberalization, CEPA requires the
non-application of anti-dumping measures (Article 7) and of countervailing
measures (Article 8). These measures have frequently been criticized for
inhibiting trade on dubious grounds and targeting cheaper imports from
developing countries.36 Therefore, the commitment to not apply these
measures is a welcome initiative to facilitate trade between the two
economies.
For trade in services, the trade liberalization initiatives of CEPA are
subject to the MFN requirement of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS"). 37 Unlike Article XXIV of the GATT governing trade
in goods, the GATS does not have a device that authorizes a customs union
or a free trade area as an exception to the MFN principle. This means that
any favorable treatment that a WTO Member provides pursuant to the terms
of a regional agreement on trade in services cannot be kept exclusive
among its member countries but will have to be extended to all other WTO
members. There is an exception in that the MFN requirement will not
apply if a member exempts certain measures from MFN treatment at the
time that the agreement enters into force for the country.3 8 Preferences for
trade in goods under the terms of CEPA will have to be extended to all
other WTO Members as neither China nor Hong Kong has made such an
exception from MFN treatment.

For a more detailed discussion of the trade effects of these measures, see Y.S. LEE,
RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM chs. 3-4 (forthcoming 2006).
37 Article 11:1 of GATS provides: "With respect to any measure covered by this
Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and
service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to
like services and service suppliers of any other country." Uruguay Round, supra note 5, at
329.
38 Annex on Article II Exemptions, Uruguay Round, supra note 5, at 352; GATT Art. II
2.
36
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III. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THE GATS
A. Investment and International Trade
Another area where bilateralism is important is investment. Foreign
direct investment ("FDI") has increased over thirty-fold during the past two
decades 39 and FDI and its regulation have become relevant to international
trade. The impact of FDI regulation on trade is easily seen. For instance,
suppose that the government of Country A requires foreign investors who
have built manufacturing facilities in the host country to export a certain
portion of each facility's output. The investors may export more than they
would have without such a requirement, leading to an increase in exports
from Country A. Alternatively, the government may require foreign
investors to buy domestically-produced products instead of imported
products which may in turn lead to a reduction in imports.
In order to prevent such "trade-distortion" caused by investment
measures, WTO disciplines regulate certain trade-related investment
measures ("TRIMs") in a rather brief set of rules entitled the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMs Agreement"), which is
comprised of nine articles and an annex. The TRIMs Agreement prohibits
investment measures that are inconsistent with Articles III and XI of the
GATT, which requires national treatment
and the general elimination of
41
quantitative restrictions respectively.
The Annex to the TRIMs Agreement provides an illustrative list of
prohibited TRIMs.42 The list includes:
(1) local content requirements (imposing the use of a certain amount of
local inputs in production); (2) import controls (requiring imports used
in local production to be equivalent to a certain proportion of exports);
(3) foreign exchange balancing requirements (requiring the foreign
exchange made available for imports to be a certain proportion of the
value of foreign exchange brought in by the foreign investment from
exports and other sources); and (4) export controls (obligating exports to

39 FDI outflows increased from 28 billion USD in 1982 to 612 billion USD in 2003,
valued at current prices. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], World
Investment Report 2004 the Shift Towards Services 9 (July 2004) (note Table 1.3: Selected

Indicators of FDI and International Production, 1982-2003).
40 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Uruguay Round, supra note 5, at
163-67.
41 LEE, supra note 36, at 116 (citing to GATT Article III regarding national treatment and
to GATT Article XI regarding quantitative restrictions, Uruguay Round, supra note 5, at
427-29, 437).
42 Id.
at 117 (citing to Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Uruguay
Round, supra note 5, at 166-67).
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be equivalent to a certain proportion of local production).43
The rationale for this prohibition is that these particular TRIMs distort trade
by requiring investors to make certain export or import commitments.44
"Nonetheless, the TRIMs Agreement is not meant to provide a
comprehensive multilateral legal framework for investment. 4 5 The scope
and the objective of the Agreement, which is to prevent the distortion of
trade by TRIMs, seems too limited to be considered comprehensive
disciplines on investment. Unlike in the area of trade, no multilateral
disciplines on investment exist. An attempt made by the OECD to create a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") was not successful. 4 6 In the
absence of a comprehensive, multilateral regulatory regime on investment a
number of BITs have governed FDI.47 Some developed countries believe
that a multilateral agreement on investment that is more comprehensive
than the TRIMs Agreement is desirable and have taken initiatives to begin
discussions at the WTO. 4 8 However, this attempt has faced considerable
resistance from some developing country members, such as India, who fear
that extensive rules on investment might place considerable restraints on
government measures and policies on foreign investment. 49 Also, doubt
exists as to whether the WTO is the best international body to address
investment issues.5 ° Thus, uncertainty remains as to whether the initiatives
to create a multilateral investment agreement at the WTO will prove
41 Id. at 116-17.

Id. at 116.
Id.
46 See supra note 9; see also OECD, Agreement on Investment: Documentation for
Negotiations, http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/mai/intro.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
47 World Bank, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2006) (finding over 1,100 BITs are known to exist and "more than 800 have been concluded
44

45

since 1987"); see also RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS,
TREATIES (1995) (offering a comprehensive review of BITs).
48

BILATERAL INVESTMENT

WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I,

20-22.

49 See LEE, supra note 36, at 114-15 (finding that "governments of developing countries

may" prefer to have latitude in prescribing investment policies to "maximize the contribution
of foreign investment" to their "development objectives").
50 T.N. Srinivasan highlighted:

[t]he folly of trying to achieve too many policy objectives with one instrument and suggested
that the TRIPS be taken out of GATT and handled by WIPO; the CTE be wound up and
environment tackled by UNEP; and labour be excluded from the purview of GATT and
handled by the ILO.

International Institute for Sustainable Development, Report on the WTO High-Level
Symposium on Trade and Development (March 17-18, 1999), http://www.wto.org/english/

tratope/envir-e/sumhldev.pdf.
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successful.
B. Bilateral Investment Treaties and GATS
As discussed above, over 1,100 BITs regulate FDI on a bilateral basis
and their consistency with certain core provisions of WTO disciplines
applying to trade in services is questionable. The general purpose of a BIT
is to provide national treatment to the investors of the other signatory
country. 51 The specific terms of numerous BITs are by no means identical
but BITs typically require non-discriminatory treatment for foreign
investors with respect to the admission and regulation of investment,
prohibit certain government investment measures, guarantee transfer of
capital and liquidation of investment, protect foreign investment against
arbitrary expropriation, and provide a fair and effective dispute resolution
process.5 3 As discussed in the preceding sections, some of the recent RTAs
include provisions that attempt to provide security for foreign investment,
such as uninhibited capital transfer, which have traditionally been the
contents of BITs.
BITs provide exclusive preference to investors from the other
signatory country. Where this preference for foreign investment facilitates
the supply of a service, it is then also subject to the jurisdiction of GATS,
which applies to trade in services. 5a GATS prescribes that the supply of
services can be made through "commercial presence in the territory of any
other member. ''55 Thus, investment that establishes such a commercial
presence for the supply of services would fall under the jurisdictions of both
GATS and the BIT, provided that the signatory countries of the BIT are
also WTO Members. The MFN requirement of GATS is applied to this
preference. Article II: 1 of GATS provides: "With respect to any measure
covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member
that it accords to like services and service
treatment no less favourable than
56
suppliers of any other country.
The question is how the preference that is applied to the supply of a
service limited to the signatories of the BITs can be consistent with the

51 The concept of national treatment in the goods trade can also be applied to the context

of FDI, which prohibits discriminatory treatment between foreign and domestic investments.
52 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, UruguaryRound, supra note 5, at
166-67 (listing examples under the annex of the TRIMs Agreement).
53 See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 47.
54 For instance, a BIT may provide foreign investors with a license to establish certain
educational services. Providing education services is the supply of a service under the
GATS.

51 Article 1.2 GATS, Uruguary Round, supra note 5, at 328.
56 Article I. 1 GATS, Uruguary Round, supra note 5, at 329.
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MFN requirement of GATS, under which such preference should be
extended to all other WTO Members. GATS, unlike the GATT, does not
require national treatment as a general principle since national treatment
applies only to the service sectors that have been scheduled for market
access, subject to the limitations and qualifications therein. 57 Thus, national
treatment and other preferences offered under the terms of BITs that
facilitate the supply of a service should arguably be applied to all other
WTO Members by operation of the MFN provision of GATS to the extent
that the stated exceptions under the Annex on Article II are not applied.58
GATS does not have a GATT Article XXIV-type exception to the MFN
requirement that allows regional trade arrangements and no other provision
exists in GATS that exempts exclusive preferential relations from the
application of the MFN principle.
Currently there is no regulatory provision to resolve the potential
conflict between the exclusive preference of BITs and the MFN
requirement of GATS. How can this problem be addressed? A question
was raised during BIT negotiations between South Korea and Japan during
1998-99 with respect to a potential conflict between bilateral preferences
stipulated in the BIT and the MFN requirement under GATS. Korea felt
this problem was solved because the Korean regulatory practice required
that any preference agreed to in bilateral investment treaties be incorporated
in relevant laws and regulations that are applied to all foreign investors. 59 If
preferential treatment of BITs that facilitate the supply of services are made
generally applicable to all foreign investors, as is the Korean practice, it will
then meet the MFN requirement under Article II of GATS. It is also
interesting to note that many BITs require that the MFN treatment be
applied for the benefit of investors of signatory countries. This means that
these investors will benefit from any preference that one signatory country
provides to others, even if this specific preference has not been negotiated
for that BIT.60
Another way to avoid the conflict is to mark the exemption of the
MFN requirements under Article 11.2 of GATS in the specific sectors
scheduled. However, it is required that these exemptions be in place
already at the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, 61 and any subsequent
exemptions can only be made by waiver under Article IX of the WTO

" Article XVII GATS, UruguaryRound, supra note 5, at 342-43.
58 Annex on Article II Exemptions GATS, UruguaryRound, supra note 5, at 352.

59 In Korea, laws and regulations that provide investment preferences are not drafted to
grant preferences exclusively to a certain group of foreigners but instead they provide
preferences to all foreigners.
60 DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 47, at 65-66.
61 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Uruguay Round,
supra note 5, at 6-18.
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Agreement, which requires a decision based on consensus at the Ministerial
Conference.62 Unlike national treatment, the MFN requirement is more
difficult to waive under GATS and acquiring MFN exemptions to preserve
exclusive preferences under BITs will be extremely cumbersome, if not
entirely impossible.
Should a GATT Article XXIV-type exception be permitted for trade in
services to allow regional/bilateral arrangements that will authorize
exclusive preferences for the supply of a service? Some may consider such
an exception to be reasonable as it is allowed for trade in goods. In
addition, numerous BITs in force predate the implementation of GATS and
there may be vested interests to maintain exclusive preferences. On the
other hand, such an exception could create the danger of fragmentation of
trade disciplines and may also cause difficulties to the trade of nonparticipating countries that do not benefit from the bilateral preferences of
BITs. Non-participating developing countries, whose export industries may
not be competitive enough, will have more difficulties. The MFN principle
of GATS should be preserved and should not be compromised with Article
XXIV-type exceptions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bilateral trade arrangements such as RTAs and BITs (the latter to the
extent that it is relevant to the supply of a service) are inherently
inconsistent with the objectives of the multilateral trading system to
facilitate non-discriminatory trade among all nations when these bilateral
arrangements attempt to preserve exclusive preferences among the
participating member countries. These preferences may facilitate trade
among the participants, but may also become a barrier to the trade of other
countries even if those barriers are not increased in absolute terms; the
exclusion from preferences is a relative barrier to the trade of other
countries, particularly that of less-competitive developing countries.
In this regard, the proliferation of bilateral trade arrangements raises
concerns. WTO Members may feel pressure to join these exclusive tradeclubs so as not to be left out. This movement toward bilateral/regional
arrangements may increase the fragmentation of trade disciplines
throughout the world. It would particularly be true where RTAs attempt not
only to reduce trade barriers but to instill new sets of trade-related rules that
have not been agreed upon by WTO Members.
Some countries,
particularly developing countries, may be tempted or even pressured to join
these new types of RTAs for economic and other incentives offered by
powerful economies that promote such RTAs. Creating another layer of
trade disciplines beyond what has been established under the WTO could
62 Id. at 11.
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undermine the consistency of global trade disciplines.
Convergence, not divergence, should be sought between
bilateral/regional trade arrangements and WTO disciplines, and these
arrangements should be brought in line with the objectives of the
multilateral trading system. Professor Srinivasan's earlier proposal to set
expirations for exclusive trade preferences of RTAs would be a way to
achieve this convergence and to prevent the fragmentation of the world
trading system. Bilateral attempts to impose regulatory burdens on
developing countries beyond what has been agreed upon in the framework
of the WTO should be restrained. When the noted convergence is achieved,
bilateralism will then operate "within" the objectives of the WTO. This
new "bilateralism within the WTO" will be positive for the facilitation of
trade as a means to expand, not exclude, trade concessions to all WTO
members. The same applies to BITs. Since the GATT Article XXIV-type
exception to the MFN principle does not exist in GATS, the enforcement of
the MFN requirement in GATS will work to expand trade-related
preferences in BITs to all WTO members.
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